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COMMENTS
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULE 12(E): MOTION
FOR MoRE DEFINITE STATEMENT-HISTORY, OPERATION AND EF-

FICACY-In 1938 the Supreme Court, pursuant to congressional
authorization, promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1
a general revision of the various procedural rules governing the
conduct of litigation in the federal courts.2 Underlying this revision was the philosophy that every individual should be assured
the opportunity to obtain justice under the law. This aim was
sought to be achieved primarily in two ways: first, by reducing
procedural technicalities to a minimum, so that cases might be
adjudicated on their merits regardless of attorneys' errors; 3 and,
secondly, by relieving congested court dockets, so that cases might
reach trial before funds were exhausted and memories had faded. 4
The basic philosophy is summarized in the admonition that the
Rules "shall be construed to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." 5
Pursuant to the underlying philosophy of the Rules, the detail
required to be stated in a complaint was greatly diminished. 6
Because a rather simple statement will fulfill the pleading requirements, in drafting a response to a complaint or preparing for
trial it may be difficult to ascertain, by reference to the pleadings
alone, precisely what issues have been raised or what allegations
must be met. Consequently, the drafters of the Rules provided
various techniques, including discovery devices, 7 the pre-trial conference, 8 and the motion for more definite statement, to aid in the
determination of these matters. While discovery and pre-trial
conferences are generally considered effective means for reducing
l Since then a number of states have revised their procedural codes along the lines
of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P.; COLO. R. CIV. P.; DEL. R. CIV. P.;
KY. R. Cxv. P.; UTAH R. CIV. P.
2 One body of rules under which the courts formerly operated was the Federal
Equity Rules. The Equity Rules of 1912 are found in HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES
.ANNOTATED (7th ed. 1930).
3 See Holtzoff, The New Civil Procedure in West Virginia, 26 F.R.D. 79, 81 (1960);
36 IND. L.J. 360 (1961).
4 See Chandler, Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure in Federal Courts, 12 OKLA. L.
REv. 321, 328 (1959).
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a): "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . • shall
contain . . • (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief . • . ." See the interpretation given Rule 8(a) by Judge Clark in
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
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technicalities and helping to relieve congested dockets, the motion
for more definite statement is commonly regarded as being used
only by those wishing to delay or conceal their own knowledge. 0
Because of this view, many judges have adopted something akin
to an a priori presumption against granting this motion which, if
it does not cause an attorney to forego its use, even when his
motive is valid, usually foretells the motion's judicial disposition.
The purpose of this comment is to trace the history of the
motion for more definite statement as provided for in the Federal
Rules, analyze the reasons for granting or denying the motion,
and propose an answer to the question of whether Rule 12(e) is
necessary, or superfluous, as part of modern federal pleading procedure.
I. HISTORY
The pleading system originated by the New York Code of
Civil Procedure10 in 1848 requires a plain statement of facts in
language enabling an adversary to understand what is alleged. 11
When the allegations are so indefinite and uncertain that the precise meaning is not apparent, the court may, in a code pleading
jurisdiction, order that the pleading be made more definite and
certain when an appropriate motion is made. 12 However, it is only
where the exact nature of the cause of action is not apparent that
the motion will be granted. 13 Particulars of time and place may
not be obtained through the device of a motion to make more
definite and certain; rather, the answering party is relegated to
use of the bill of particulars.
At common law, the bill of particulars was a document setting
forth and attacking the pleader's allegations which the answering
party considered to be stated with insufficient definiteness. It was
the proper recourse where the claim or defense set out in the
pleading was sufficient as far as general allegations were concerned,
but specific facts leading to the general conclusions alleged were
o See Chandler, supra note 4, at 328.
10 Commonly referred to as the "Field Code." See generally Coe & Morse, Chro•
nology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942).
11 See N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr: § 241.
12 See N.Y. RuLES CIV. PRAc. § 102: "If any matter contained in a pleading is so
indefinite, uncertain or obscure that the precise meaning or application thereof is
not apparent, the court may order the party to serve such amended pleading as the
case may require."
13 Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N.Y. 176 (1874). See generally 2 .ABBOIT, TRIAL BRIEF 1923
(1904); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §§ 442-43 (5th ed. 1929). The New York concept carried over to the other code states. See, e.g., Chicago & E.R.R. v. Lawrence, 169 Ind. 319,
79 N.E. 363 (1906); Pierson v. Green, 69 S.C. 559, 48 S.E. 624 (1903).
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being sought. 14 A response to the bill of particulars could be required of a pleader in any type of action. In most code pleading
states, the bill of particulars is the same as the common-law bill; 15
however, in some states, particulars may be obtained only in an
action involving an account or money demands arising upon contract.16 While the motion to make more definite and certain may
be filed before the answer, the code bill of particulars may be filed
only after the answer has been made. 17
As originally promulgated, Federal Rule 12(e) read:
"Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired .... A bill of
particulars when filed becomes a part of the pleading which
it supplements."
The committee formulating the Rules apparently failed to anticipate some difficult problems which subsequently arose as a
consequence of including the motion for a bill of particulars in
Rule 12(e) as originally drafted. Use of the bill of particulars
had been regarded as efficacious in preventing surprise and limiting the issues, and, since resulting in the inclusion of more detail
in the pleadings, it thereby enabled defendants to prepare for
trial with the least expense.18 However, this was inconsistent with
the generality in pleading permitted by the Federal Rules. Furthermore, the discovery and pre-trial conference devices performed
the same functions more effectively. Accordingly, there was frequent abuse of Rule 12(e)'s provisions, as originally promulgated:
first, by those who desired additional facts in complaints simply
because they refused to accept the basic philosophy of generalized
pleading; second, by those who wanted to embarrass their adver14

See 2 .ABBoTl', op. cit. supra note 13, at 1943. See generally CLA!Ut, CODE PLEADING

§ 54 (2d ed. 1947).
15 See, e.g., N.Y. RULES CIV. PRAc. § 115: "Any party may require any other party
to give a bill of particulars of his claim • • • by serving a written notice stating the
items concerning which such particulars are desired."
16 See, e.g., Price v. Bouteiller, 79 Conn. 255, 64 Atl. 227 (1906); Board of County
Comm'rs v. American Loan 8e Trust Co., 75 Minn. 489, 78 N.W. 113 (1899).
17 Updike v. Mace, 156 App. Div. 381, 141 N.Y. Supp. 587 (1913).
l,8 See Caskey 8e Young, The Bill of Particulars-A Brief for the Defendant, 27 VA.
L. R.Ev. 472, 474 (1941).
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saries or to delay; 19 and, third, by those who desired more information, without resorting to discovery, than that which they alleged
had been pleaded "ambiguously or indefinitely" in the complaint.
In response to the overwhelming number of such motions made,20
some courts refused to grant the motion when the movant's sole
motive was to acquire additional information "to prepare for
trial." 21 Others equated the filing of a bill of particulars to the
making of a motion for more definite statement, and refused to
grant the motion where it was made solely to elicit facts not
pleaded, irrespective of the purpose for which the information
was desired. 22 Finally, in 1948, on the recommendation of the
Advisory Committee,23 Rule 12(e) was amended to read:
"If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for
a more definite statement before interposing his responsive
pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained
of and the details desired ...."

Thus, the bill of particulars was finally deleted from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, to the chagrin of only a few.M
With the demise of the bill of particulars there has also been
a diminution in the judicially reported use of the motion for more
definite statement. A ruling on such motion is interlocutory in
nature and cannot be immediately appealed, but usually must
await the final decree.25 If it does survive trial, the party wishing
to appeal the determination on the motion will have to shoulder
19 See Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D.
155 (1953).
20 In Stayton 8: Boner, The Plastic Code in Operation, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 561, 572
(1958), the authors note that in 1943 alone twenty-one pages of the Federal Rules
Service were required merely to index cases deciding what particulars would or would
not justify granting of the motion.
21 See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 1473, 1476 (1958).
22 See IA BARRON 8: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 412 (1960).
23 See ADVISORY COMM, ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED .AMEND•
MENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR TIIE DISTRICT COURTS OF TIIE UNITED STATES
9 (1946).
24 A vigorous dissent to any elimination of the bill of particulars had been presented
at an earlier date by Caskey &: Young, supra note 18. They presented the side of the
defendant's attorney to whom, they argued, the bill of particulars was an "invaluable
aid," Id. at 472.
25 See Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F,2d 126 (5th Cir. 1959); IA BARRON
&: HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 22, at 462. However, it is possible that an interlocutory
appeal might be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958), where "an immediate appeal
• • • may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
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the heavy burden of showing an abuse of judicial discretion.26
These factors account for the paucity of federal circuit court of
appeals and Supreme Court decisions construing the Rule. Motions for more definite statement arise in the federal district courts
much more frequently than the published decisions indicate, and
are not reported because of the rather perfunctory treatment accorded them by district court judges.27 Only forty-one decisions
on Rule 12(e) motions have been published during the period
from 1957 through 1962.28 In approximately one-third of the cases
-fourteen-the motion was granted; the remaining twenty-seven
cases involved orders denying the motion. This particular period
of time was selected for concentration in this comment because it
presumably is sufficiently removed from the date of amendment
to ensure that the new motion for more definite statement was not
confused with the old bill of particulars. Moreover, these recent
cases should provide a fairly accurate indication of what may be
expected in the future.

Il.

APPROPRIATE GROUNDS FOR GRANTING OR DENYING
A RULE 12(E) MOTION

To grant a Rule 12(e) motion properly, the court must decide
that the pleading is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading."20 Literally interpreted, the phrase "vague or ambiguous" obviously applies to a pleading the terminology of which is capable of having
two or more possible meanings. Usually, however, the phrase is
interpreted to include also the pleading which, on the whole, is
so indefinite and uncertain that the opposing party cannot be
expected to understand the "nature of the claim." 30 As used here,
"nature of the claim" refers to the legal wrong for which the
20 That the disposition of the motion does rest in the trial court's discretion has
been stated in several cases. See, e.g., Etablissements Neyrpic v. Elmer C. Gardner, Inc.,
175 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
27 The writer's personal research in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan discloses that motions for more definite statement arise with much
more frequency than is revealed by written opinions in reported cases. This was verified
in a discussion with Judge Talbot Smith, of the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Oct. 6, 1962. Judge Smith also noted that a major reason for the
large volume of such motions is "the carryover into the federal system of a practice
commonly employed in state courts not having a discovery practice as liberal as that
of the federal courts."
28 See Appendix at end of this comment for a complete listing of the cases.
29 FED. R. C1v. P. 12(e).
ao Cf. Hartman Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Wis. 1949);
Walling v. American S.S. Co., 4 F.R.D. 355 (W.D.N.Y. 1945).
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plaintiff is seeking redress-for example, a claim for personal
injury based upon defendant's negligence, the elements of which
would be duty, breach, causation and resulting injury. Whether
the court can understand the "nature of the claim" by reference
to the pleading will probably be a key determinant in deciding
if a particular pleading is so defective that the 12(e) motion should
be granted.
In most federal courts, the requirement of stating the "nature
of the claim" is satisfied when the claimant sets out the elements
showing that a legal ·wrong has been committed and that he is
entitled to relief. 31 These courts interpret the Federal Rules as
doing away with the narrow "theory of the pleadings" doctrine
which requires, in part, that the pleader clearly designate each
separate legal theory that he intends to rely upon. 32 Judge Clark
has stated:
"A simple statement in sequence of the events which have
transpired, coupled with a direct claim by way of demand for
judgment of what the plaintiff expects and hopes to recover,
is a measure of clarity and safety; and even the demand for
judgment loses its restrictive nature when the parties are at
issue, for particular legal theories of counsel yield to the
court's duty to grant the relief to which the prevailing party
is entitled, whether demanded or not." 33
Once the elements of the claim are clearly set forth, the question then arises as to whether the motion for more definite statement might nevertheless be granted if the movant claims that
insufficient facts are stated in the pleading. Code pleading rules
require that a complaint contain a "statement of facts constituting
a cause of action." 34 Some federal courts, having read this requirement into the Federal Rules, expect the plaintiff to plead the
particular facts upon which the claim is based. Thus, when a
31 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), in which the Court noted that the
Federal Rules do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim. The Court stated: "To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short
and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 47. See also the various
federal forms which are sufficient for use in pleadings under the Rules. Form 6, for
example, which is a complaint for money lent, requires no more than: "Defendant owes
plaintiff ten thousand dollars for money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June I, 1936."
32 See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 14, § 43.
33 Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1945).
34 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Ac:r § 241. (Emphasis added.) See CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 14, § 19, for an explanation of the various interpretations given the term "cause of
action."
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12(e) motion is made for the purpose of eliciting further information, it is usually granted, the rationale being that the opposing
party has not received sufficient notice. But these courts appear
to be incorrectly granting the motion when all the elements of a
legal wrong have been pleaded, and they are in effect thereby
enabling the movant to secure additional facts which can properly be obtained through discovery. 35 This approach emphasizes
fact pleading and improperly detracts from the concept of notice
pleading which the drafters of the Rules sought to effectuate.
Thus, there has been a tendency, on the part of some federal courts,
to bring the bill of particulars back into the Federal Rules. 36
Illustratively, the motion for more definite statement has been
granted-incorrectly-to enable the responding party to ascertain
the date or dates on which the allegedly illegal acts took place37
and to allow the defendant to educe which of plaintiff's numerous
trademarks, patents, or copyrights he allegedly infringed.38 Furthermore, the motion has been granted to allow the movant to
determine with whom it allegedly conspired to violate the law,39
to ascertain the names of employees who allegedly acted on its
behalf,40 and to learn which statutes it allegedly violated. 41 In
all of these cases, the movant seems to have had notice of the
"nature of the claim," since the elements of a legal wrong had
adequately been pleaded. Moreover, the additional facts being
sought were not necessary to permit the movant to frame an adequate response.
Therefore, it is seemingly erroneous to interpret the phrase
"nature of the claim" to mean anything more than, for example,
the elements of a claim for negligence or breach of contract.
35 See, e.g., United States v. Schofield, 152 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Plaintiff,
in an attempt to collect unpaid income taxes, sued to recover the alleged cost of improvements made by the deceased taxpayer on land in which he had a life estate. Although
defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, it was treated as a motion for
· more definite statement and granted for the purpose of obtaining a more adequate
description of the alleged improvements.
86 See text accompanying note 48 infra, as to the denial of a motion for more definite
statement because movant is actually seeking a bill of particulars.
87 See Buchholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Kuenzell v. United
States, 20 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
38 See Lincoln Labs., Inc. v. Savage Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. 141 (D. Del. 1960); Marvel
Slide Fastener Corp. v. Klozo Fastener Corp., 80 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
39 See, e.g., George W. Warner &: Co. v. Black &: Decker Mfg. Co., 167 F. Supp. 860
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
40 See Syan Holding Corp. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 20 F.R.D. 154 (E.D.
Pa. 1957).
41 See, e.g., Sanitized, Inc. v. S. C. Johnson &: Sons, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y.

1959).
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"Vague or ambiguous" should be construed to mean so mixed up,
so incoherent, that, although the complaint might well state a
claim, it is practicably impossible to discern the "nature of the
claim." The pleading of a party appearing prose would, in some
instances, probably provide a good illustration of such a confused
complaint. 42 However, so long as the answering party has sufficient
notice of the claim to enable him to respond, the motion should
be denied. The responding party is not required to deny or admit
all allegations, but can state that he is "without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment."48 Moreover, the Rules do not call for a perfect answer
or one that will precisely frame the issues. It was stated in regard
to the complaint in Wilson v. Illinois Gent. R.R.:
"Want of detail in a pleading is not a fatal vice so long as
the complaint is not so vague or ambiguous that a party
cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading . . . . The complaint here attacked, while not a model
of verbal precision, is sufficient to apprise the defendant of
enough to permit it to file an answer." 44
Of course, the defendant may still need additional details to enable him to prepare for trial. The proper procedure to be used
is discovery, 45 rather than the motion for more definite statement.46
This conclusion flows principally from the fact that the phrase
"or to prepare for trial" was deleted from the wording of Rule
12(e) as amended in 1948.47 Furthermore, if it appears to the
court that the motion is being used in substance as a bill of par42 An example may be Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), where
Judge Clark held the complaint good as against a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. It seems that, if a motion for more definite
statement had been made, it might well have been granted. Concerning the complaint,
the court stated: "We may pass certain of his claims as either inadequate or inadequately
stated and consider only these two: (1) that on the auction day, October 9, 1940,
when defendant sold the merchandise at 'public custom,' 'he sold my merchandise to
another bidder with my price of $HO, and not of his price of $120,' and (2) 'that three
weeks before the sale, two cases, of 19 bottles each case, disappeared.' Plaintiff does not
make wholly clear how these goods came into the collector's hands, since he alleges
compliance with the revenue laws; but he does say he made a claim for 'refund of
merchandise which was two-thirds paid in Milano, Italy' and the collector denied the
claim.''
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
44 147 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
40 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 23 F.R.D. 101 (S.D. Ind. 1958); Mitchell
v. Independent Stave Co., 159 F. Supp. 829 0,V.D. Mo. 1957).
47 Contrast Rule 12(e) as originally enacted with the amended Rule, as discussed in
the text at notes 23-24 supra.
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ticulars to secure additional information, the motion will be denied and the movant advised to resort to discovery. 48
A few courts,49 in requiring the complainant to plead additional facts, have done so on the ground that he has failed to meet
the requirement of Rule S(a) that a complaint shall contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief." 50 These courts find some "residual meaning"
in Rule S(a) which seemingly indicates that more facts than are
necessary for a general statement of the elements of the claim
must be pleaded in order to convey a "plain statement of the
claim." Such an interpretation seems tenuous at best, for Rule
S(a) conveys the theory, implicit throughout the Federal Rules
and illustrated in Form 8, 51 that a bare statement of the elements
of the claim is all the notice that is required to be given in the
complaint. 52 In fact, other courts have frequently-and correctly
-referred to Rule S(a) in determining that the motion for more
definite statement should be denied where defendant has received sufficient notice. A court may actually cite Rule 8 and
hold that the pleading is sufficient to comply with its standards; 53
or, without specifically citing S(a), it may state that more particularity than the complaint contains is not required by the Rules. 54
Rules S(a) and 12(e) are so interrelated that any time the 12(e)
motion is denied it seems apparent that the pleader has met the
requirements of Rule S(a). 55
On the other hand, the Federal Rules require that certain
48 See, e.g., Acoustica Associates, Inc. v. Powertron Ultrasonics Corp., 28 F.R.D. 16
(E.D.N.Y. 1961); Cmax, Inc. v. Hall, 290 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum).
49 See, e.g., Fennell v. Svenska Amerika Linien A/B, 23 F.R.D. 116 (D. Mass. 1958);
Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire &: Rubber Co., 3 F.R.D. 55 (D.N.D. 1943).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
51 FED. FORM 8: "Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for money had and
received from one G.H. on June 1, 1936, to be paid by defendants to plaintiff."
52 See Re v. Fullop, 22 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Ill. 1958); IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 53.
53 See, e.g., Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959), where
the court asserted: "In view of the great liberality of Federal Rule ..• 8, permitting notice
pleading, it is clearly the policy of the Rules that Rule 12(e) should not be used to
frustrate this policy by lightly requiring a plaintiff to amend his complaint which under
Rule 8 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss."
54 See, e.g., Colton v. Wonder Drug Corp., 21 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); MacDonald
v. Astor, 21 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
55 This is accomplished by saying that the complaint is not "vague or ambiguous"
within Ruic 12(c) if it includes a "plain statement of the claim" within Rule 8(a); and,
conversely, if the complaint is "vague or ambiguous," then it does not contain a "plain
statement of the claim."
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matters be pleaded with particularity. 56 For instance, Rule 9(b) 57
demands that "all averments of fraud or mistake shall be stated
with particularity." Thus, in Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co.58 the plaintiff's second count was essentially an
allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation. As to this count, defendant moved for a more definite statement, and, because the
allegation did not comply with Rule 9(b), the court granted the
motion. Although utilization of the 12(e) motion appears to be
a valid method for obtaining the missing details, it seems that a
court, in granting it, may be allowing a misuse of the motion.
The purpose of the motion is to enable defendant to understand
what has been included in the complaint, not to give plaintiff the
chance to supply particulars necessary to a claim. If a court finds
that the pleading is not vague or ambiguous, it should deny the
motion and suggest that the plaintiff supply the missing essentials, 59 or that the defendant file a motion to dismiss for "failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 60

III.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RULING ON THE MOTION

Additional considerations may be important in arriving at a
decision on the granting or denying of a 12(e) motion. These
factors alone may be sufficient as a basis for a ruling on such a
motion, but often they are only auxiliary to the court's main
rationale. If the particular information being sought is within
the movant's own knowledge, a 12(e) motion would probably be
denied. 61 Although such a reason is rarely the sole basis for denying the motion, it is still a significant factor. In Etablissements
Neyrpic v. Elmer C. Gardner, Inc., 62 although the 12(e) motion
was denied primarily because discovery was available, the court
made it clear that it was unnecessary to include the requested
information in the complaint since it was within the defendant's
own knowledge. Such reasoning appears to be readily justifiable.
The complainant has given notice of the claim, and the opposing
party is aware of the allegations which must be answered. Therer;o Thus, there are a few, but very few, exceptions to the requirement of the Federal
Rules that the pleader need give only notice of the nature of his claim.
57 Fm. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
58 145 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
01 See, e.g., Philadelphia Retail Jewelers Ass'n v. L. &: C. Mayers, 1 F.R.D. 606 (E.D.
Pa. 1941).
02 175 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
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fore, the movant should be made to draw from his own knowledge
in responding and not be allowed to impose a burden on the complainant to amplify his pleading with matters already known.
Another factor frequently considered relevant is the existence
of an intention on the part of the movant to follow the 12(e)
motion with a motion for dismissal or judgment on the pleadings,
once the nature of the claim is determinable. Thus, the 12(e)
motion has been denied on the ground that to grant it "would
be a misuse of the rule. Its function is to enable the movant to
prepare a responsive pleading and not to serve as a forerunner
for a motion to dismiss." 63 Such reasoning seems questionable~
If the pleading to be answered is so "vague or ambiguous that
a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive
pleading," why should the moving party's motive determine
whether the motion should be granted? Any complaint which
fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted" is subject
to dismissal. The method by which it is ascertained that there is
no claim upon which relief can be granted should be irrelevant. 64
Finally, a 12(e) motion, which was unopposed by the pleader,
has been granted in two different types of situations. On the one
hand, when the plaintiff conceded that the complaint' should be
more definite, the court was clearly justified in granting the
motion. 65 But, where the court's sole reason for granting the motion was the lack of opposition by the plaintiff,66 the result seems
less justifiable. The burden is imposed upon the court to determine, in its sound discretion, 67 whether the complaint is vague
or ambiguous. The motion should not be granted unless the complaint is so indefinite that defendant cannot reasonably be expected to formulate a responsive pleading. Whether plaintiff has
opposed the motion should have no bearing on the court's decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasons advanced by federal courts for granting or denying the motion for more definite statement have encompassed a
63 Harrington v. Yellin, 158 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1958); accord, Lodge 743,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 30 F.R.D. 142 (D. Conn. 1962);
Cather v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., IO F.R.D. 437 (D. Neb. 1950).
64 Perhaps what these courts are really saying is that the complaint is sufficient and
the movant is just trying to get more facts.
65 See Mil-Hall Textile Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
66 See, e.g., Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
67 See note 26 supra.
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range far greater than was intended when Rule 12(e) was
adopted. 68 Rule 12(e) was modeled after the Field Code motion
to make more definite and certain, which was granted when the
pleading was so incoherent that the moving party could not
reasonably understand that to which he must respond. If only
the word "ambiguous" had been used in Rule 12(e), then perhaps
the courts would have granted the motion only when the pleading to be answered was so confusing that a response could not
reasonably be made. The word "vague" connotes the idea of a
lack of sufficient detail and specificity. Perhaps the inclusion of
this alternative standard-vagueness-has provided the basis for
granting the 12(e) motion to allow the moving party to obtain
additional facts. This usage, however, goes beyond the purpose
for which the motion was intended. It probably reads the old
bill of particulars into the "more definite statement" concept; and,
at the very least, it creates a substitute for discovery. 69 Whether
this usage brings back the bill of particulars or creates an alternative to discovery, it seems incorrect and, as such, should not be
allowed.
The motion for more definite statement, nevertheless, may
have a usefulness beyond clearing up the mixed-up pleading.
In the so-called "big case," such as extended antitrust litigation,
an order made pursuant to a 12(e) motion requiring the pleader
to include specific details in his allegations may save the movant
both time and expense which might be lost if he were forced
to rely entirely upon discovery and pre-trial conferences. For
example, in a suit charging conspiracy to monopolize part of a
trade or business,70 such an allegation alone may be construed as
giving defendant sufficient notice of the "nature of the claim."
The defendant cannot always be expected to be cognizant of what
act or acts, performed at what times, and with what parties, the
plaintiff is complaining. In these circumstances the 12(e) motion
could provide an economical means for the defendant to ascertain the particular acts referred to by the plaintiff in his complaint.
Thus, such use should be allowed even though technically incorrect. 71 However, the great majority of cases arising in the federal
68 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N INSTITUTE, FEDERAL Rur.Es OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, at 41, 242 (Wash. and N.Y. 1938).
60 In James, supra note 21, at 147!!-76, the point is made that through the wide range

of information afforded to the person obtaining discovery today, we are perhaps bringing
the bills of particulars into the Federal Rules all over again.
70 See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
71 But see the opinion of Judge Clark in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326
(2d Cir. 1957).
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courts are not the "big cases," and so, ordinarily, no such justifiable
misuse of the motion should be permitted.
In view of the fact that the use of the motion for more definite statement has been so significantly diverted from its original
purpose of clearing up pleadings to which a response could not
reasonably be required, it is now questionable whether the motion should be retained in the Federal Rules. As has been noted,
the granting of the motion creates delay. Furthermore, alternative
means are available for accomplishing results presently being
achieved through the improper use of Rule 12(e). Discovery is
available for the elicitation of facts; and discovery may be obtained prior to the filing of a responsive pleading,72 although it
has thus far been infrequently used in such a manner. The motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted73 should be used where it appears that the pleader has
not actually stated a claim. If a claim is found not to have been
stated, the pleader should be given leave to amend, 74 with the
claim being dismissed if he does not do so.
It would thus appear that the motion for more definite statement, as frequently used in contemporary federal pleading and
practice, is superfluous and unnecessary. There are two possible
methods of dealing with it. The first, and least satisfactory, would
be to delete the motion entirely from the provisions of the Federal
Rules. This would eliminate any possibility of misuse of the
motion, but, on the other hand, it would also prevent any use of
the motion to assist the responding party by facilitating his understanding of the truly mixed-up, or incoherent, pleading. And
under the Federal Rules it seems to be the only motion which
could be used to clear up such a pleading. It might also result in
an unnecessary rash of motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, 75 which could become as misused as the motion for more
definite statement now is. The second method, here proposed, is
to eliminate the words "vague or" from the wording of the Rule.
This should eliminate the use of the motion to obtain facts or
evidence from the complainant and would properly relegate the
responding party to the use of discovery procedures for such in72 Rule 26 allows the taking of a deposition any time "after commencement of an
action." Rule 3 states: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." Thus, discovery is available any time after the complaint is filed. Furthermore,
a deposition may be available, even before an action is commenced, under Rule 27.
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
74 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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formation. With only the word "ambiguous" remaining, the
courts would be more likely to constrain themselves to granting
the motion only where the pleading appears to be so confusing
that the adverse party could not reasonably be expected to frame
a responsive pleading, and the motion for more definite statement would have an added potency and usefulness in litigation
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Stefan F. Tucker, S.Ed.
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